our guests are the legendarychess master garry kasparov and the widely acclaimed "washington post" journalistrobert kaiser. the focus of their discussion is mr. kasparov's book,"winter is coming: "why vladimir putinand the enemiesof the free world must be stopped." together they will be discussingthe views put forth in this very provocativenew book.
your book is full of passion,not least because-- and--and--and very rewarding,i should say, to read, i felt, not least because it compelsits reader to grapple with some very seriousand very big questions. you don't let the readeroff the hook. your devastating portraitof vladimir putin is an important--is an importantcontribution, i think. but first, since we're sitting in the carnegie councilon ethics
in international affairs, i thought we might startby discussing your powerful call in this bookfor a moral foreign policy, particularlyfrom the united states and its western allies. "a moral policy is necessary,"you write, "if we are to prevailagainst authoritarian and terrorist rivalsand enemies." maybe we should startwith definitions.
what is a moral foreign policy? i have been trying, as a formerprofessional chess player, to look back, to analyzethe moves that were made in the gamethat the free world has won, the cold war, and, um, i believe it was notjust because of, you know, economic or military factors, uh, but most of allbecause of the moral values, because of the core valuesof the free world
that were compellingfor people who lived like me, born and raised on the otherside of the iron curtain. i was trying to demonstratein the book that while fromthe end of the world war ii to the end of the cold war, from harry trumanto ronald reagan, the united states' foreignpolicy was fairly consistent. there were some fluctuations,but it was in the range, uh, because bothdemocrats and republicans,
um, presidentsfrom both parties, they just recognized there was an existential threatfrom communism and, you know, workingwith the institutions built by--by the trumanadministration in--in the forties, you know, they--theyfollowed this path. what happened in '91, '92, you know, instead of beingconsistent,
u.s. foreign policy workedmore like a pendulum, you know, swingingfrom one side to another. so clinton did little, bush 43 did too much, obama has been doing nothing, and it created a very dangerousvacuum in the world because whether american alliesor--and friends or foes, they--they--they werequite puzzled, of course for different reasons,
because expectingu.s. foreign policy to make a u-turnwith--with a new president-- with--with new masterof the oval office-- uh, is quite challenging, and, um, i, um--i think that it's time to come up with another-- you may call it a doctrine, if we go backto the mid-forties-- um, to build this doctrine, um,with a vision of the future,
with a strategy. it's not thinking, "what we willdo now, now, now, now." it is a bit to understandhow actions today could--could contributeto a better, safer world, prosperous world,peaceful environment, 2, 3, 4, 5 years from now. kaiser: so definea moral policy. what would--what would itconsist of? kasparov: you know,a moral policy, it's--it's a--
if we are talkingabout, you know, moral issues-- for instance, i believe thateven dealing with--with allies, long-term allies,like saudi arabia, the united states cannot refrainfrom harsh criticism of the human rights records. so it's very importantthat, uh, the, um--the--the new world order-- if you--if we can usethese wo--words, although i understand they are--it could be quite tricky-- uh, should be based on--on--on--on--on the values
that--that are fundamentalfor the free world, and i believe, you know,these moral issues, they will resonate well with people who live today in--in--in--in the unfree world, because there are stillbillions of people who live in the totalitarianor non-democratic countries, and many of them havefundamental mistrust to--to american foreign policy because they could see,you know,
business, uh, and--and short-term interests, not a strategic visionthat could benefit everybody. you've used the term in the bookand again this morning, "existential threat." it seems to methat one of the differences between the world that i covered when i was the moscowcorrespondent of "the washington post" in the early seventiesand today
is that--that the nature ofthe threat is quite different. give me your view of that. kasparov: yeah, i agreethat, you know, the--the--existential threat that the united statesand the free world faced 70, 60, 50, 40, maybe even30 years ago, but less so, um, it's--it's--it's--it's no longer there. uh, though, of course, we-- you know, we have a paranoiddictator in russia--
the country now today isa full-blown one-mandictatorship-- that was not the casein the soviet union. naturally, russia under putinis--is a pale shadow, economically and militarily, of what the soviet union was. and once, speaking at a--at cnbc, uh, show, uh, on the floor ofthe new york stock exchange, i said that from this room, the united states could domore damage to putin's russia
than all the presidents fromharry truman to ronald reagan could do during the cold war. so russia today, of course,is much more vulnerable, but the--as you said correctly, the--the nature of the threathas changed, and if 30, 40, 50 years ago, the united statesfaced the soviet union as the sort of--as a leaderof--of this, uh-- of the global coalitionagainst the free world,
today there is no leader. of course, putin is--isthe most powerful enemyof the free world, but there are manyother groups, uh, that do exist, and they could inflict damage, um, not as big as--as--as--as the soviet union could or putin can today, but still, you know, it--it could be extremelypainful and tragic. what i tried to explainin the book is that, uh, while the worldis getting smaller
thanks to the technologies, it created, you know,communications, and it's--it's also createdan illusion that it--it means progressautomatically, while this device is agnostic;it is neither good nor bad. it simply, you know, helps usto transfer information. it can help us with business,with finance, with social/cultural exchange, but it also helps terrorists,
and they know how touse social networks, and the problem is that,you know, while this world is so small, and we can learn whateveris happening in the world within a split second, you know, whether it is an earthquakein--in--in pakistan or a tsunami in indonesia or elections elsewhere or so,in argentina, um, the--the guys on the otherside of--of--of--of the fence,
uh, they have no choice but to, uh, keep goingwith this open conflict with the free world because otherwisethey cannot justify their--their politicalexistence. what else, you know,they can offer to those they oppress,they govern? so it's not accidentalthat putin's domestic policy is based entirelyon anti-american propaganda.
so if you--if you switchto--to--to russian talk shows, you will not find anythingabout russia. it's about ukraine,it's about georgia, it's about estonia,it's about, uh, syria, and of courseit's about america. and it--it doesn't matter whether america is tryingto be friendly and offering a reset button. at the end of the day,it's all about finding enemies,
and the samewith iranian mullahs, the same with other thugsand terrorists. they need a big target, they need the free worldas--as an enemy, and of course americaas--as the--as a looming target, because--because without it, they will have to competewith us in innovations, technologies, ideas, and they know thatthis competition
is lost from the beginningto them, uh, and they know they have onecompetitive advantage over us. it's the value of human life. for us each loss of human lifeis--is--is a tragedy. for them, sacrificing millions, it's just a demonstrationof their strength. kaiser: one of the bigdifferences between the cold war eraand today in this country is the great declineof confidence in america,
in the american government, in american institutions,et cetera. but this is echoedall around western europe, too. western european public opinionis not enthusiastic about supportingmilitary establishments or about supportingforeign military adventures, just as is the casein this country. you prescribe in your booka pretty forceful, you know, sometimes evenaggressive, policy,
but how are you going to getpublic support for that policy? today i thinkit's very important for people to understand that, you know, even if we believewe are done with the war, the war is not done with us, so it will--you know,certain things will continue. i mean,the san bernardino attack, many believe could bean accident, but it will continue
because for isis of this world-- and i say "isis"because it could be al-qaeda, it could be isis-- at the end of the day, you know, the way these terroristorganizations build is just to--they--again, they are not competing with its--with, um,the free world, um, in economy or even in ideas. it's all about demonstratingtheir brutality,
uh, and--and terror. uh, by the way,the soviet union, uh, after stalin's death, became sort of like a countrywith its communist dictatorship, but with collective leadership. and as china today, you know, we can see that any collectiveleadership is far more stable than one-man dictatorship, because even if you have10 bad guys making decisions,
they will alwayslook for balance, um, and that's why you couldexpect the soviet union to, you know, with--with--with--with this global competition and with many proxy wars, still, you know,trying to be reasonable and to follow sort ofthe international regulations, and you could hardly expectsoviet leaders, you know, not to respecttheir own signature, as putin did several timesalready.
i hope that the american publicnow will start, you know, recognizing that, you know,two giant oceans are no longer offeringprotection against these threats, and america is the mostglobalized economy in the world, and if--if you expectto benefit from global trade, from global exchange, you know,the global labor market, social networks, uh, you can't pretend that you--
you--you are no longer partof this--of--of global affairs, and without the united states-- maybe that's the--that's the greatest lesson of obama's presidency is-- you know, withoutthe united states playing a key role in some ofthe most explosive regions, what happens is, you know, it's the vacuum being filledby other guys. so if america walks awayfrom the middle east,
uh, it's not--it doesn't mean there will be lasting peacethere. it means you--we are now facinga potential war between saudi arabia and iran. even to be more precise, it is already a proxy warbetween these two countries, and we already--we already see, you know, um, the, um, hundredsof thousands of people killed, millions refugees,
and things couldget only worse, because, you know,nobody likes to hear stories about global policemen now, but do you want to live ina neighborhood without police? kaiser: well, that's-- we could have a good discussionabout that, but we won't this morning. kasparov: i would like--i would like syrians or, you know, other peoplejust, you know,
to--to--to participatein this discussion. kaiser: yeah, sure.i understand. i understand. but i think your assumptionthat we have the capacity, we, the united states, to fix things upin these countries or in--or in that region, i would dispute this... kasparov: but, look--but it's--
you know, fixing doesn'tmean that, you know, you have to, you know,uh, get there and all-- it's not abouta full-mounted assault. so it's the--i thinkit's a mistake to think that we have choices between, you know,george w.'s, you know,aggressive approach and obama's appeasementpolicies. between war and appeasement, there is a vast territorycalled leadership,
and, uh, i believe that,you know, many things can be done if you--if you arein the position to make a credible threat. ronald reagan hadn't usedmuch of a force, but, you know,he achieved certain results. so it's about, um,restoring the credibility of--of the office--of the oval office, and i think that the--the--the last two presidencies
contributed dramaticallyto the, um-- to, uh, the destructionof--of--of this credibility, because, you know, if you sendtroops all over the place, you know, it's--it's not a sign of strength, and if you take them backwithout any conditions and declare that you--you wantto--to sort of disengage from most, you know, um,explosive regions in the world, that's also a sign of weakness. kaiser: your goal,as you write in the book,
is the democratizationof authoritarian regimes, among other things. i'm not sure how we do that. i want you to talkfor a minute about china, which you mentioned. if our goal starting tomorrowwas to democratize china, how would we do that? did i say china in the book? kaiser: no, i said china.
kasparov: yeah, but--uh, i'm not an expert on china, so--and i think it would be,um, quite foolish to think that, you know,you can, uh, inspire the--the changes in china by some very aggressive,you know, proactive policy. i mean, china is china. it's--it's much more powerfulthan russia in every term today. uh, but speaking about russia, which i know a bit betterthan china, so it's--the bookactually argues
not for providing any supportfor, um, russian opposition. the book argues--arguesthat america's faulty policy, accompaniedby the european powers, was to provide supportfor putin's regime at the very beginning. uh, it was very difficult forpeople like me or boris nemtsov to talk to, uh, this verylimited russian audience that we could reachin, say, 2006, 2007 and to tell them about the truenature of putin's regime,
when even for those who liked usand wanted to believe us, they had channel 1,channel 2, channel 3, showing putin hosting g8 summit, having bush, blair, berlusconi, merkel, already,i think at that time, chirac, harper. so who--who to believe? putin knew how to buildhis reputation as the--as the democraticallyelected leader of russia,
and, uh, what's happened overthe first 8 years of his--of his rule-- i don't use the word"presidency" because, you know,even when technicallysomebody else was there, he was still in charge-- and even today,we hear, uh, voices, um, saying that we hadbetter deal with putin because putin is, um, you know-- is--is the bestwe can get in russia.
so, um, putin knew,and he--he knows how to play this gameof political poker, how to sort of use even--even--even his weak hand, but to bluff,to raise the stakes, and to get concessions he needs. today, you know, he doesn't needfriends, as 10 years ago, he needs enemies, and he--and he does itextremely well by sort of creating an imageof an invincible leader
who can defy the free world, especially the united states. so i--i have to say that,you know, some of his, you know, uh,pr coups staged-- one of them actually was herein--in new york in september-- they were masterpieces. when he just arrived here forunited nations general assembly, uh, he was here officiallyto deliver a speech. "the wall street journal" askedme to--to write an editorial.
i said i could do itin advance because i knew that, you know, the whole trip was not about--was not about the--the speech, but about meeting obama, and it was actuallynot to discuss anything but actually to make a picture, and if--probably you rememberthe picture, that putin's reluctanthandshake with obama. uh, i bet you he spent a fewhours in front of the mirror
actually practicing this, because he knowsthe power of the image. this is--this the imagethat goes back to russia, and everybody could see putin, uh, just reluctantly shakingobama's hand because he had no choicebut to go to new york, the belly of the beast, to the--to the general assemblyof the united nations, meet the u.s. president,
and the next day russian planes bombed american-backedopposition in syria. my mother, she stilllives in moscow. she's 78, she was bornand raised under stalin. she heard, you know, all sortsof soviet propaganda, from stalin to khrushchev,brezhnev, gorbachev, and now, you know, she--she keeps telling me that the difference betweenputin's propaganda machine and what she heardwhen she was younger
is that soviet propagandacontained some elements of the positive future. it was still an ideathat one day, with all the sacrifices,you know, we could reach our shining houseon the hill, you know, with communism, brotherhood. putin's propagandahas no positive images. it's--it's like a cult of death. it's all about conflict,it's about confrontation,
so it's--it's--it's very dark, uh, and that's the way putinruled the country, because, uh, with--with furthereconomic decline in russia, with the deteriorationof the socioeconomic conditions, you know, you could hear moreand more aggressive propaganda on a 24/7 basis. uh, and again,it's not a sign of strength, but, unfortunately, you know,it's being desperate, you know, he could dodesperate things.
and, you know,if oil goes down to 20, i'm not sure that nato borderswill stop him. [applause] you were bornin baku, azerbaijan. kasparov: yes. man: that is the houston, texas,of russia. you must fully realizehow weak an economic hand putin is holding. it is a petrol state.
there are very few exports to the rest of the worldfrom russia except for natural gas, which they hold as a swordof damocles over europe, and oil. the other factor, i think,limiting his hand is the advent of cyber-warfare. we could take downthe soviet electric grid with the flip of a few switches,
if he invaded the baltics,for example. how powerful do you thinkthose two factors are in limiting hisboth internationaland domestic strength? um, thank you for reminding meabout my birthplace. yes, i, uh--in america,i often say that, you know, i was born and raisedin the deep south right next to georgia. [laughter] which is factually correct,you know,
as azerbaijan bordersthe republic of georgia, and it was the deep southof the ussr. now, uh, you areabsolutely right, you know, just describing the--the economic situationin russia. so--and when you lookat all the numbers that--of putin's 16-year-old--uh, 16, uh, years of rule, you'll find out that, you know,it--it--it became much worse. so, um, in the year 2000, the share of oil and gasand refinery products
in russian export was 40%. today it's 70%. when you look at, you know,russian roads, for instance, you know, so it's the--we built in 2014, 2015 4 times lessthan in the year 2000. so all this moneythat has been accumulated-- we're talking about probablytrillions of dollars- they were not investedin rebuilding russianinfrastructure, but rather making, you know,a new class of billionaires.
now, speaking about economicweakness, again, being--being right on explaining, you know,the--the situation in russia, i'm not sure that, you know, you are reachingthe right conclusion, because, yes, putin is weak, and he knows that--that there is no way he can improve the situation, but he also has--he hasburned all the bridges.
there is no way for himto retire. it's like a golden cage--cage, so the only response could be,you know, to start another war. so it's--you are talkingabout america, you know, um, being able to--to cause this huge damage-- that's what i said.absolutely. no--there's no doubtthat the united states and the european alliescould do-- uh, you know, could doterrible damage to russia.
the problem isyou haven't done it. you could stop crimea, you could stop warin eastern ukraine, you could do many things,but nothing happened. and putin--the wayputin sees it, it's not about power,it's about will. he has a weak hand, yes,he has a pair of 5, and obama has a full house, but it doesn't matter in poker.
this is not chess. it's only a transparent game when you can see, you know,what you have and what your opponent has. it's--it's about your will. and i said, you know,at the beginning of this--of this, uh,ukrainian--ukrainian crisis and annexation of--with annexation of crimea-- i said that, you know, this--this--the europeans, you know,
they--they--they were lookingfor any excuse not to be aggressive and, uh--uh, by defendingthe borders, which, again, was the--it's a pillar of--of--of europeanand global security since 1945, because they havea very different viewof potential damages. so if you cut your finger,or you do hari-kari, there is blood in both cases,with different outcomes, but it seems to methat putin is betting
on lack of political will, and that's--that's what i amtrying to--to--to encourage. i want to see, for instance,bipartisan debate here in this country, uh, to talk aboutcomprehensive policy, to--to send a message, because sometimes with a messageyou can reach more, uh, than--than with--you know, with sending troops. the problem with that--
uh, with demonstratingweakness, with a policy of appeasement, at every new, uh, cycleof the crisis, you will have to employstronger measures. so--and, uh, my fear isthat, you know, putin may misreadthese messages, and if he feels desperate,as i said-- and check with estoniansor latvians-- uh, he can decide that,you know,
he can start a hybrid warin narva or, um, elsewhere. if the russian army marchedinto ukraine today, would you recommendthat the u.s. go to war? i never recommendedthe united states to, uh, use force,you know, um, to send-- to use boots--bootson the ground, in ukraine. what i said,and i am saying now, is that ukraine was a very-- it was a very important test forthe resolve of the free world
to defend the existingworld order. um, unlike estonia, latvia,or poland, ukraine is not a member of nato, so that's why, you know, the united states has no directobligations to, uh, send troopsto defend this country, but it's about the credibilityof the office, and i believedfrom the very beginning that the united states couldoffer more to help ukraine,
and i think it's--it's--it's a shame that this administration-- actually, it's notthe administration; it's one person, the presidentof the united states, who acted against the advice-- against the adviceof the congress, bipartisan support, against the adviceof the state department, and against the adviceof his own vice president--
and i'm not goingto mention the pentagon-- so to provide ukrainewith lethal weapons. and i saw the listof these weapons required by the ukrainians. it's a very small list. you know, one u.s. base,you know, could actually provide itwithout even noticing, you know. it was--it would be moreof a psychological, um, move to send a message to putinand to russian generals,
because at the end of the day, it's--it's--it's--it'sthe cold war mentality, which unfortunately we--we--we're living through now. it was about, you know,your psychological readiness to stand your groundand to, uh, demonstrate resolve, and, uh, showing weakness incrimea and in eastern ukraine, so i believe that the westis--is--is provoking-- is provoking putinfor further actions. if putin moves, you know,into ukraine,
um, of course more helpwill be needed, but, uh, the ukrainian armyis pretty strong, strong enough to inflict damagebeyond repair to putin, and he knows. the reason he stopped in--in--eastern ukraine was not because he--he turned to be a dove, you know, out of a hawk. he just calculatedthe--the--the damages, and he knew that, you know,it would be devastating for him
to see thousands of body bagscoming from ukraine to russia. um, he expected thatethnic russians in ukraine, uh, would--would be embracingrussian tanks and russian soldiers. contrary to his expectations, the overwhelming majorityof ethnic russians in ukraine signed for the ukrainian army, not--not for--for the invading force. what actually we sawin eastern ukraine
was more likea russian civil war. most of the people fightingon the ukrainian side were ethnic russians because they knewwhat putin's russia was, and they didn't want tolive in--in--in this country, so it was a conscious choiceof--of ukrainians and russians living in ukraine to stick with europe and not to go back to the--putin's, you know, golden horde.
well, i want to thank you bothfor a 21st-century discussion on 20th-century history. announcer: for more on this program and other carnegie ethics studio productions, visit carnegiecouncil.org. there you can find video highlights, transcripts,
audio recordings, and other multimedia resourceson global ethics. this program is made possibleby the carnegie ethics studio and viewers like you.
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